Inheritance Tax upon Failure to Exercise Special Power of Appointment by Bush, Richard, Jr.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 11
1939
Inheritance Tax upon Failure to Exercise Special
Power of Appointment
Richard Bush Jr.
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bush, Richard Jr. (1939) "Inheritance Tax upon Failure to Exercise Special Power of Appointment," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 28 : Iss.
1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol28/iss1/11
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
She also has implied power under article 4623 to become, jointly with
her husband, the joint [italics added] maker of a note or a surety
on any bond or obligation of another." So it would seem that
if the husband does not consent to become jointly bound with his wife
as surety, she may not so bind herself. However, if the consent of the
husband is to be considered as a matter of course, then Texas belongs
in Class II.
The theory behind the rule in this third class is that the law, while
it has removed the wife's disabilities with regard to the ownership and
disposition of property, should nevertheless protect the interest of the
feme covert from being wasted and impaired by the assumption, through
undue family influence, of debts for the benefit of others. While these
states are willing to remove disabilities for her interest, they were not
willing to allow her to enter into contracts from which no benefit could
be derived. PTTLrn, SonrI"
INHERITANCE TAX UPON FAILURE TO EXERCISE SPECIAL
POWER OF APPOINTMENT.
Property may be deeded or devised subject to the exercise of two
types of powers, namely, general and special. Under a general power
the donee is unrestricted in his selection of the person or persons to
whom he may appoint;1 under a special power his selection is restricted
to a named class or group2 Generally, when property is deeded or
devised subject to the exercise of a power, the donor provides that it
shall pass to a certain person or persons in default of an exercise of
the power by the donee. This note will be devoted to a discussion of the
imposition of a succession tax upon the failure of the donee to exercise
a special power.
Under the Federal Estate Tax Act,3 property subject to a general
power of appointment is made a part of the gross estate of the donee
for the purpose of computing the estate tax, but only when the power
is exercised and the property appointed to someone other than the
person or persons named to take in default of an exercise of the
power.'
Most state statutes impose a succession tax upon the passage of
the property to the beneficiary at the death of the donee, whether
1 Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (1931); Johnstone v. Comr. of
Internal 'Revenue, 76 F. (2d( 55 (1935), certiorari denied 56 S. Ct. 89,
296 U. S. 578, 80 L. Ed. 408 (1935); St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette,
259 Ky. 802, 83 S. W. (2d) 471 (1935); Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288,
156 At. 84, 76 A. L. R. 1427 (1931).
2Id
326 U.S.C.A. see. 411(f). Mississippi also has a similar statute,
Miss. Code (1930), sec. 5069.
4Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354 (1935).
5Arizona Rev. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928) see. 3160; Colo. Sees.
Laws (1933) Chap. 106, see. 2(8); Idaho Code (1932) sec. 14-402(6);
Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) sec. 79-1520; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936) sec.
4281a-14; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) Chap. 65, sec. 2; Mich. Comp. Laws
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the power be general or special, and whether the donee does or does
not exercise it. The general form of state statute is exemplified by the
Wisconsin statuteE which follows:
"Whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a power
of appointment derived from any disposition of property, made
either before or after the passage of sections 72.01 to 72.24, inclu-
sive, such appointments, when made, shall be deemed a transfer
taxable under the provisions of sections 72.01 to 72.24, inclusive, in
the same manner as though the property to which such appoint-
ment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power, and
had been bequeathed or devised by such donee by will; and when-
ever any person or corporation possessing such a power of ap-
pointment so derived shall omit or fail to exercise the same within
the time provided therefor, in whole or in part, a transfer taxable
under the provisions of sections 72.01 to 72.24, inclusive, shall be
deemed to take place to the extent of such omission or failure, in
the same manner as though the persons or corporations becoming
entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the property to which
the power related had succeeded thereto by a will of the donee of
the power failing to exercise such power, taking effect at the time
of such omission or failure."
The constitutionality of this type of statute has been attacked in
several cases. The majority of these cases have involved the exercise
of, or the failure to exercise, a general power of appointment, but
generally the courts have made no distinction between general and
(1929) sec. 3672(4); Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) sec. 2292(5); Mo. Rev.
Stat. (1929) sec. 571; Mont. Rev. Code (Anderson & McFarland, (1935)
sec. 10400.1(5); N. M. Stat. (1929) sec. 141-1118; N. C. Code (1927)
sec. 7880(1); N. D. Supp. to Comp. Laws of 1913 (1913-25) sec. 2346b-
1 (5); Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1939) sec. 5332(4); R. I. Gen. Laws
(1926) Chap. 810, sec. 5(3), (it is to be noted that an alternative
method Is provided in see. 18); S. C. Code (1932) sec. 2480(e); S. D.
Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 6827(3); W. Va. Code (1937) sec. 842(e); Wis.
Stat. (1937) sec. 72.01(5).
The following states impose the tax as if the property had been
devised or bequeathed by the donee, but only when the power is
exercised; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) Chapt. 120, sec. 375(4); N. Y. Consd.
Laws (Cahill, 1930) Chap. 61, see. 220(4); Wash. Laws (1931) Chap.
134, sec. 2.
The following states have statutes taxing property subject to
powers in different manners: Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1937) Act
8495, see. 2(6), taxes as a transfer from donor to donee at donor's death,
superseding Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act. 8443, sec. 2(6); Iowa
Code (1930) sec. 7307(4), provides for tax on property "passing under
power. . . ."; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) Chap. 77, sec. 2, taxes property
subject to a power as a succession from the donor to the beneficiary
named to take in default; Miss. Code (1930) sec. 5069, same as federal
estate tax; N. T. Rev. Stat. (1937) sec. 54;34-1(d), taxes "property
transferred persuant to a power of appointment . . ."; Tenn. Code
(1932) sec. 1260, "Transfers under powers of appointment shall be
taxable in like manner and to the same extent as if property of the
testator or donor was transfered."
4 Wis. Stat. (1937) sec. 72.01(5).
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special powers, whether exercised or not, and have upheld the statutes
From the decisions, it appears that three views have been taken
in cases involving the failure to exercise a power. The New York
view, expressed In re Lansing's Estate,8 is that the beneficiary named
to take in default of an exercise of the power takes a vested interest
in the property at the time of the donor's deed or death; that nothing
passes to him upon the donee's death without exercising the power;
and, therefore, there can be no tax imposed at the donee's death. This
case also involved the so-called New York doctrine of election.' The
donee, by his will, had appointed the property to the beneficiary named
to take in default. The court held that the beneficiary could elect to
take under the deed of the donor, rather than under the will of the
donee, and the result would be the same as if the power had not been
exercised. In a later decision, the New York court has taken away
any actual election by the beneficiary, and held that the election will be
presumed where it will benefit him.*
A second view is expressed in Manning v. Board of Tax Commis-
sioners,1 a Rhode Island case. The court there held that the beneficiary
named to take in default receives a vested interest in the property under
the will or deed of the donor, but, upon the death of the donee without
exercising the power, there is a new right-the right to possession and
enjoyment-which accrues to the beneficiary, and which is a proper
subject of the tax.
Massachusetts advances still a third view, in Minot v. Stevens.
2
2
There the court considered the property not vested in anybody until
the death of the donee, and held that, when it vests in possession,
through a proper disposition of it which is dependent upon the will
and conduct of the donee (in appointing or failing to appoint), there
is a succession which is a proper subject of the tax.
The few cases found which involve the failure to exercise a special
power appear to follow the same trend expressed in the cases involving
the failure to exercise a general power. However, in states In which
the New York view is not followed, it would seem that the question
might become one of degree. If the beneficiary named to take in
default of an exercise of the power is not one of the group or class to
whom the donee could appoint, there would seem to be no difference
in the problem presented than in the case of a general power; also,
where the beneficiary named to take in default is one of that group or
class, and there is more than one member of that group or class living
at the donee's death, the problem appears to be the same as in the
7 See In re Lansing's Estate, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905), In
which New York held the statute unconstitutional in the case of a
failure to exercise a power. California also followed the Lansing case
in In re Murphy's Estate, 183 Cal. 740, 190 Pac. 46 (1920).
'182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905).
'For a discussion of this doctrine, see, Thompson, Inheritance Taxa-
tion and Powers of Appointment, 1939 Wis. L. R. 254, 266-70.
24in re Sanford's Estate, 290 N. Y. Supp. 959 (1936).
a'46 R. I. 400, 127 Atl. 865 (1925).
2207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (1911).
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case of a general power; but, where the beneficiary named to take in
default Is the only member of that class or group surviving the donee,
the question of whether there is a taxable succession becomes a closer
one.
There have been no cases found in which the first of the above
mentioned situations was present, namely, where the beneficiary named
to take in default is not one of the group or class to whom the donee
could appoint, but due to the broad discretion rested in the donee in
that situation, there would seem to be little doubt that the statute
would be upheld.
The problem presented in the second situation, namely, where
the beneficiary is one of the named group or class and two or more
of the group or class survive the donee, has been decided in the cases
of Burnham v. Stevens" and Montague v. State.14
In the Burnham case, the donor left property in trust to his son
for life, with power in the son to appoint among his children or grand-
children as he saw fit, and in default of an exercise of the power to
the son's children equally. The son died without exercising the
power. The court said the question to be determined was, whether it
should give the same effect to a failure to exercise a special power
which it had given to the failure to exercise a general power in the
Minot case, supra. In upholding the statute, the court answered that
question in the affirmative, saying:
"Until the death of the donee and his exercise or failure to
exercise the power of appointment it could not be known in what
proportions the children or grandchildren would take. Until that
event happened the estate in children did not become complete and
the succession was not fully determined. It cannot be said there-
fore that the estate had so vested in the children as to render the
Imposition of a tax under the statute above referred to uncon-
stitutional."1
The facts of the Montague case were similar to those of the
Burnham case. The court said:
"The provision (of the statute) that a transfer resulting from
the failure of the donee to appoint shall be deemed to constitute a
taxable transfer equally with a transfer resulting from an appoint-
ment, Is valid, because the failure to act equally effects the course
of succession and until such failure is complete the succession is
not fully determined."-15
From these cases, it appears that the courts, for the purposes of
taxation, regard the failure to exercise a special power, in a case in
which there is another of the group or class besides the beneficiary
named to take in default, surviving the donee, in the same light as
the failure to exercise a general power. The decisions in the two
types of cases are, therefore, based upon the same theory, which is,
212 Mass. 165, 98 N. E. 603 (1912).
1163 Wis. 58, 157 N. W. 508 (1916).
' Italics ours.
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that until the death of the donee the succession is not complete and
upon his death there is a passage of possession and enjoyment, which
is a proper subject of a succession tax.6
Should this second situation arise in a state in which the non-
illusory appointment doctrine is followed, and the power be a non-
exclusive one, the problem assumes an additional aspect.
Under a non-exclusive power, the donee must appoint at least
a part of the property to each member of the class or group;" under
the non-illusory appointment doctrine, a substantial part of the
property must be appointed to each member.8 The question would
then arise-does not the beneficiary named to take in default have a
non-defeasible vested interest in a substantial part of the property
under the deed or will of the donor, which interest could not be taxed
upon the donee's death? Obviously, the beneficiary does have such an
interest under the will or deed of the donor, but it seems probable that
the tax would still be upheld under the theory that the grouping of
all powers into one classification for the purposes of taxation is just
and reasonable, and further, it cannot be known until the donee's
death just what proportion the beneficiary will take.
The problem presented in the third situation above has been found
only in the Lansing case, supra, and, as these situations were set forth
for a discussion of cases arising in jurisdictions which do not subscribe
to the New York view, that case is of little aid. This factual situation,
namely, where the beneficiary named to take in default is the only
member of the class or group (to whom the donee can appoint) sur-
viving the donee, represents the exceptional and closest case which
can arise under this type of statute, because upon the death of the
donee the property would pass to that beneficiary whether the power
was exercised or not. Although there have been no decisions concern-
ing this situation, it is submitted that the courts could, and probably
would, uphold the statute under the same theory expressed in the
Burnham and Montague cases, supra, because, as was said above, it
appears reasonable, for the purposes of taxation, to group all powers,
whether exercised or not, in the same class, regardless of whether the
donee could change the course of succession. There appears to be
little basis for upholding the statute in this situation upon the ground
that the action or inaction of the donee determines the succession.
RIoHrAnD BusH, Jn.
' Minot v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (1911); Burnham
v. Stevens, 212 Mass. 165, 98 N. E. 603 (1912); Manning v. Bd. of Tax
Com'rs, 46 R. I. 400, 127 At. 865 (1925); Montague v. State, 163 Wis.
58, 157 N. W. 508 (1916).
2 Barrett's Ex'r. v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 411, 179 S. W. 396 (1915).
'aId.
